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Abstract
We present a syntactic abstraction method to reason about first-order modal logics by
using theorem provers for standard first-order logic and for propositional modal logic.
1 Introduction
Verification of distributed and concurrent systems requires reasoning about temporal behaviors.
A common approach is to express the properties to be proved in a modal logic having one or
more temporal modalities. For verifying real-world systems, a proof language must also include
equality, quantification, interpreted theories, and local definitions. It must therefore encompass
FOML (F irst Order M odal Logic) and support operator definitions. One such language is
TLA+ [10], based on the logic TLA that has two temporal modalities: the usual ✷ (always)
operator of linear-time temporal logic and ′ (prime), a restricted next-state operator such that
e ′ is the value of e at the next state if e is an expression that does not contain a modal operator.
A common way to prove an FOML sequent Γ |= ϕ (ϕ holds in context Γ) is to translate it to
a semantically equivalent FOL sequent Γ∗ |=FOL ϕ
∗ and to prove this FOL sequent. For some
FOMLs, this method is semantically complete—that is, Γ |= ϕ is valid iff Γ∗ |=FOL ϕ
∗ is [12].
This approach has been followed for embedding FOML in SPASS [9], Saturate [7], and other
theorem provers.
Such a semantic translation may be appropriate for completely automatic provers. However,
we are very far from being able to automatically prove a formula that expresses a correctness
property of a non-trivial system. A person must break the proof into smaller steps that we call
proof obligations, usually by interacting with the prover. Requiring the user to interactively
prove the semantic translation of the FOML formula destroys the whole purpose of using modal
logic, which is to allow her to think in terms of the simpler FOML abstraction of the theorem.
The user should therefore decompose the FOML proof into FOML proof obligations.
In this paper we describe a method called coalescing that handles many FOML proof obli-
gations by soundly abstracting them into formulas of either FOL or propositional modal logic
(ML). The resulting formulas are dealt with by existing theorem provers for these logics. Al-
though the basic idea of coalescing is simple, some care has to be taken in the presence of
equality and bound variables. The translation becomes trickier in the presence of defined op-
erators.
∗This work has been partially funded by the Microsoft Research-Inria Joint Centre, France. It has also been
supported by the European Union Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement no. 295261 (MEALS)
and by the French BGLE Project ADN4SE.
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Outline of this Paper. Section 2 motivates our proposal by its application within the TLA+
Proof System TLAPS. Section 3 formally introduces FOML and its two fragments, FOL and
ML. Sections 4 and 5 present coalescing for modal and first-order expressions respectively,
proving their soundness. Section 6 extends the results to languages containing local definitions.
In Section 7 we outline a proof of the completeness of coalescing for proving safety properties.
Section 8 discusses semantic translation vs. coalescing and suggests some optimizations and
future work.
2 Motivation
2.1 A Sample TLA+ Proof
Our motivation comes from designing the TLAPS proof system [5] for TLA+, which can check
correctness proofs of complex, real-world algorithms [11]. The essence of TLA proofs is to
decompose proofs of temporal logic formulas so that most of the obligations contain no modal
operator except prime. Figure 1 contains the outline of the proof of a simple safety property in
TLAPS that illustrates this decomposition. The system specification is formula Spec, defined to
equal Init ∧✷[Step]v . In this formula, Init is a state predicate that describes the possible initial
states, and Step is an action predicate that describes possible state transitions. Syntactically:
Init is a FOL formula containing state (a.k.a. flexible) variables; Step is a formula containing
state variables, FOL operators, and the prime operator; and v is a tuple of all state variables
in the specification. The formula [Step]v is a shorthand for Step ∨ (v
′ = v), and ✷ is the
usual “always” operator of temporal logic. The temporal logic formula Spec is evaluated over
ω-sequences of states; it is true of a sequence s0s1 . . . iff Init is true at state s0 and, for all pairs
of states si and si+1, either Step is true or the value of v does not change. The definitions of
the formulas Init and Step, and the reason for writing ✷[Step]v instead of ✷Step, are irrelevant
in the context of this paper. We wish to prove that a state formula Safe(p) is true throughout
any behavior described by Spec, for every process p ∈ Proc.
The right-hand side of Figure 1 shows the assertion and proof of the theorem. The first
step in the proof is purely first-order: it introduces a fresh constant p, assumes p ∈ Proc, and
reduces the overall proof to showing the implication Spec ⇒ ✷Safe(p). Step 〈1〉1 asserts that
the initial condition implies Safe(p). This formula does not contain any modal operators. Step
〈1〉2 shows that Safe(p) is preserved by every transition (as specified by [Step]v ). The proof
of this step is essentially first-order, although TLAPS must handle the prime modality. The
basic idea is to distribute primes inward in expressions using rules such as (x + y)′ = x ′ + y ′,
Init
∆
= . . .
Step
∆
= . . .
v
∆
= . . .
Spec
∆
= Init ∧ ✷[Step]v
Safe(p)
∆
= . . .
theorem Spec ⇒ ∀ p ∈ Proc : ✷Safe(p)
〈1〉. suffices assume new p ∈ Proc
prove Spec ⇒ ✷Safe(p)
obvious
〈1〉1. Init ⇒ Safe(p)
by def Init , Safe
〈1〉2. Safe(p) ∧ [Step]v ⇒ Safe(p)
′
by def Safe, Step, v
〈1〉3. qed
by 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, PTL def Spec
Figure 1: Proof of a safety property in TLAPS.
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and then to replace the remaining primed expressions by new atoms. For this example, we are
assuming that the specification is so simple that, after the definitions of Init , Next , v , and Safe
have been expanded, the FOL proof obligations generated for these two steps can be discharged
by a theorem prover.
Step 〈1〉3 concludes the proof. It is justified by propositional temporal reasoning, in partic-
ular the principle
P ∧ A⇒ P ′
P ∧ ✷A⇒ ✷P
The PTL in the step’s proof tells TLAPS to invoke a PTL decision procedure, which it does
after replacing Spec by its definition and the formulas Init , Safe(p) and [Next ]v by fresh atoms.
This effectively hides all operators other than those of propositional logic, ✷, and prime.
We call coalescing the process of replacing expressions by atoms. It is similar to the intro-
duction of names for subformulas that theorem provers apply during pre-processing steps such
as CNF transformation. However, it has a different purpose: the fresh names hide complex
formulas that are meaningless to a proof backend for a fragment of the original logic. As ex-
plained in the example above, TLAPS uses coalescing in its translations to invoke FOL and
PTL backend provers, where the first do not support the modal operators ✷ and prime, and the
second do not support first-order constructs such as quantification, equality or terms. An idea
similar to coalescing underlies the KSAT decision procedure [8] for propositional multi-modal
logic in that modal top-level literals are abstracted by fresh atoms. Unlike KSAT, we consider
first-order modal logic, and we do not recursively construct formulas that must be analyzed at
deeper modal levels.
Coalescing cannot in itself be semantically complete because it cannot support proof steps
that rely on the interplay of the sublogics. For example, separate FOL and PTL provers cannot
prove rules that distribute quantifiers over temporal modalities. Similarly, proofs of liveness
properties via well-founded orderings essentially mix quantification and temporal logic. How-
ever, we need very few such proof steps in actual proofs, and we can handle them using a
more traditional backend that relies on a FOL translation of temporal modalities. Coalescing
is complete for a class of temporal logic properties that includes safety properties, which can
be established by propositional temporal logic from action-level hypotheses. For these appli-
cations, we have found coalescing to be more flexible and more powerful in practice than a
more traditional FOL translation. In particular, proofs need not follow the simple schema of
the proof shown in Figure 1 but can invoke auxiliary invariants or lemmas. The inductive rea-
soning underlying much of temporal logic is embedded in PTL decision procedures but would
be difficult to automate in a FOL prover. On the other hand, the prime modality by itself is
simple enough that it can be handled by a pre-processing step applied before passing the proof
obligation to a FOL prover.
2.2 Coalescing In First-Order Modal Logic
We believe that coalescing will be useful for proofs in modal logics other than TLA+. We
therefore present its fundamental principles here using a simpler FOML containing a single
modal operator ✷. Corresponding to the translations we have implemented in TLAPS, we give
two translations of FOML obligations, one into FOL and the other into ML, and we prove their
soundness.
The idea underlying coalescing is very simple: abstract away a class of operators by intro-
ducing a fresh atom in place of a subformula whose principal operator is in that class. However,
doing this in a sound way in the presence of equality is not trivial because of the Leibniz prin-
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ciple, which asserts (d = e) ⇒ (P(d) = P(e)) for any expressions d and e and operator P .
The Leibniz principle is valid in FOL but not FOML, which makes translating from FOML
obligations to FOL obligations tricky [6].
For example, the formula (v = 0) ⇒ ✷(v = 0) is not valid in TLA+ or more generally in
FOML when v is flexible. A naive application of standard FOL provers could propagate the
equality in the antecedent by substituting 0 for v throughout this formula, effectively applying
the instance ((v = 0) = true) ⇒ (✷(v = 0) = ✷true) of the Leibniz principle, and conse-
quently prove the formula using the axiom ✷true. Such an approach is clearly unsound. The
standard translation of FOML into predicate logic [12] avoids this problem by making explicit
the states at which formulas are evaluated, but at the price of adding significant complexity
to the formula. Moreover, one typically assumes specific properties about the accessibility re-
lation(s) underlying modal logics. Incorporating these into first-order reasoning may not be
easy. For example, the ✷ modality of TLA+ corresponds to the transitive closure of the prime
modality, and this is not first-order axiomatizable. Of course, whether this is an issue or not
depends on the particular modal logic one is interested in: semantic translation works very well
in applications such as [3] that are based on a modal logic whose frame conditions are first-order
axiomatizable.
Our approach is to coalesce expressions and formulas that are outside the scope of a given
theorem prover. For the example above, coalescing to FOL yields (v = 0)⇒ ✷(v = 0) where
✷(v = 0) is a new 0-ary predicate symbol, and this formula is clearly not provable. Similarly,
coalescing to ML yields v = 0 ⇒ ✷ v = 0 of propositional modal logic, and again, this formula
is not provable. We give a detailed description of how to derive a new symbol exp for an
arbitrary expression exp. Care has to be taken when the coalesced expression contains bound
variables. For example, a naive coalescing into FOL of the formula ∀ a : ✷(a = 1)⇒ a = 1,
which is valid over reflexive frames, would yield ∀ a : ✷(a = 1) ⇒ a = 1, from which we can
deduce ✷(a = 1) ⇒ 0 = 1 and then ∀ a : ¬✷(a = 1), which is clearly not valid. A correct
coalescing yields ∀ a : ✷(a = 1) (a)⇒ a = 1.
Operator Definitions. Coalescing is trickier for a language with operator definitions like
P(x , y)
∆
= exp , where exp does not contain free variables other than x and y. Definitions
are necessary for structuring specifications and for managing the complexity of proofs through
lemmas about the defined operators. We therefore do not want to systematically expand all
defined operators in order to obtain formulas of basic FOML. The Leibniz principle may not
hold for an expression P(a, b) if the operator P is defined in terms of modal operators—that
is, (a = c) ∧ (b = d) need not imply P(a, b) = P(c, d). It would therefore be unsound to
encode P as an uninterpreted predicate symbol in first-order logic. We show how soundness is
preserved by replacing an expression P(a, b) with P , ǫ1, ǫ2 (a, b), for some suitable expressions
ǫ1 and ǫ2 (described in Section 6.3 below), where P , ǫ1, ǫ2 can be defined so it satisfies the
Leibniz principle and also satisfies P , ǫ1, ǫ2 (a, b) = P(a, b) in suitably extended models of
FOML, ensuring equisatisfiability of the original and the coalesced formula. Since it satisfies
the Leibniz principle, P , ǫ1, ǫ2 can be taken to be an uninterpreted predicate symbol by a
first-order theorem prover. Our construction extends to the case of definitions of second-order
operators, which are allowed in TLA+.
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3 First-Order Modal Logic
3.1 Syntax.
We introduce a language of first-order modal logic whose modal operator we denote by ∇ in
order to avoid confusion with the ✷ of TLA+. The language omits the customary distinction
between function and predicate symbols, and hence between terms and formulas. This simplifies
notation and allows our results to apply to TLA+ as well as to a conventional language that
does distinguish terms and formulas—the conventional language just having a smaller set of
legal formulas.
We assume a first-order signature consisting of non-empty distinct denumerable sets X of
rigid variables, V of flexible variables, and O of operator symbols. Operator symbols have
arities in N and generalize both function and predicate symbols. Expressions e of FOML are
then inductively defined by the following grammar:
e ::= x | v | op(e, . . . , e) | e = e | false | e ⇒ e | ∀ x : e | ∇e
where x ∈ X , v ∈ V , op ∈ O, and arities are respected (empty parentheses are omitted for
0-ary symbols). We do not allow quantification over flexible variables, so our flexible variables
are really “flexible function symbols of arity 0”. While TLA+ allows quantification over flexible
variables, it can be considered as another modal operator for the purposes of coalescing.
The notions of free and bound (rigid) variables are the usual ones. We say that an expression
is rigid iff it contains neither flexible variables nor subexpressions of the form ∇e. The standard
propositional (true, ¬, ∧, ∨, ≡) and first-order (∃) connectives are defined in the usual way.
The dual modality ∆ is introduced by defining ∆e as ¬∇¬e. The extension to a multi-modal
language is straightforward.
3.2 Semantics.
A Kripke model M for FOML is a 6-tuple (I, ξ,W ,R, ζ,∇M), where:
• I is a standard first-order interpretation consisting of a universe |I| and, for every operator
symbol op, an interpretation I(op) : |I|n → |I| where n agrees with the arity of op. We
assume that the universe |I| contains two distinguished, distinct values tt and ff.
• ξ : X → |I| is a valuation of the rigid variables.
• W is a non-empty set of states, and R ⊆ W ×W is the accessibility relation.
• ζ : V ×W → |I| is a valuation of the flexible variables at the different states of the model.
• ∇M : 2
|I| → |I| is a function such that ∇M(S ) = tt iff S ⊆ {tt}.
Note that we assume a constant universe, independent of the states of the model, and we also
assume that all operators in O are rigid—i.e., interpreted independently of the states.
We inductively define the interpretations of expressions [[e]]Mw at state w of modelM. When
the model M is understood from the context, we drop it from the notation.
• [[x ]]Mw =def ξ(x ) for x ∈ X
• [[v ]]Mw =def ζ(v ,w) for v ∈ V
• [[op(e1, . . . , en)]]
M
w =def I(op)([[e1 ]]
M
w , . . . , [[en ]]
M
w ) for op ∈ O
• [[e1 = e2]]
M
w =def
{
tt if [[e1]]Mw = [[e2]]
M
w
ff otherwise
5
Coalescing for Reasoning in First-Order Modal Logics Doligez, Kriener, Lamport, Libal, Merz
• [[false]]Mw =def ff
• [[ϕ⇒ ψ]]Mw =def
{
tt if [[ϕ]]Mw 6= tt or [[ψ]]
M
w = tt
ff otherwise
• [[∀ x : ϕ]]Mw =def


tt if [[ϕ]]M
′
w = tt for all M
′ = (I, ξ′,W ,R, ζ,∇M) such that
ξ′(y) = ξ(y) for all y ∈ X different from x
ff otherwise
• [[∇ϕ]]Mw =def ∇M({[[ϕ]]
M
w ′ : (w ,w
′) ∈ R})
We write M,w |= ϕ instead of [[ϕ]]Mw = tt. We say that ϕ is valid iff M,w |= ϕ holds for all
M and w , and that it is satisfiable iff M,w |= ϕ for some M and w . We define a consequence
relation |= as follows (where Γ is a set of formulas): Γ |= ϕ iff for all M, if M,w |= ψ for all
ψ ∈ Γ and w ∈ W , then M,w |= ϕ for all w ∈ W .
Our definition of the semantics is a straightforward extension of the standard Kripke seman-
tics to our setting, where ∇e need not denote a truth value. The condition on the function ∇M
used for interpreting ∇ ensures thatM,w |= ∇ϕ iffM,w ′ |= ϕ for all w ′ such that (w ,w ′) ∈ R
as in the standard Kripke semantics. Because we assume a constant domain of interpretation,
both Barcan formulas are valid—that is, we have validity of
(∀x : ∇ϕ) ≡ ∇(∀x : ϕ). (1)
Moreover, since all operator symbols have rigid interpretations, it is easy to prove by induction
on the expression syntax that [[e]]w = [[e]]w ′ holds for all states w ,w
′ whenever e is a rigid
expression. It follows that implications of the form ϕ⇒ ∇ϕ are valid for rigid ϕ—for example:
∀ x , y : (x = y)⇒ ∇(x = y). (2)
3.3 FOL and ML fragments of FOML
Two natural sublogics of FOML are first-order logic (FOL) and propositional modal logic (ML).
FOL does not have flexible variables V or expressions ∇e. A first-order structure (I, ξ)
consists of an interpretation I as above and a valuation ξ of the (rigid) variables. The inductive
definition of the semantics consists of the relevant clauses of the one given above for FOML,
and the notions of first-order validity |=FOL ϕ, satisfiability, and consequence carry over in the
usual way.
ML does not have rigid variables, quantifiers, operator symbols or equality. A (propositional)
Kripke model for ML is given as K = (W ,R, ζ) where the set of states W and the accessibility
relation R are as for FOML, and the valuation ζ : V × W → {tt, ff} assigns truth values to
flexible variables at every state. The inductive definition of [[e]]Kw ∈ {tt, ff} specializes to the
following clauses:
• [[v ]]Kw = ζ(v ,w) for v ∈ V
• [[false]]Kw = ff
• [[ϕ⇒ ψ]]Kw = tt iff [[ϕ]]
K
w = ff or [[ψ]]Kw = tt
• [[∇ϕ]]Kw = tt iff [[ϕ]]
K
w ′ = tt for all w
′ ∈W such that (w ,w ′) ∈ R
The notions of validity |=ML ϕ, satisfiability, and consequence carry over as usual.
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4 Coalescing Modal Expressions
4.1 Definition of the abstraction eFOL
One of our objectives is to apply standard first-order theorem provers for proving theorems
of FOML that are instances of first-order reasoning. Since the operator ∇ is not available
in first-order logic, we must translate FOML formulas ψ to purely first-order formulas ψFOL
such that the consequence ΓFOL |=FOL ϕFOL entails Γ |= ϕ. A naive but unsound approach
would be to replace the modal operator ∇ by a fresh monadic operator symbol Nec. As
explained in Section 2, this approach is not sound. As we observed, a sound approach is
to define ϕFOL by using the well-known standard translation from modal logic to first-order
logic [4, 12] that makes explicit the FOML semantics. However, that translation introduces
additional complexity—complexity that is unnecessary for proof obligations that follow from
ordinary first-order reasoning.
Instead, we define ϕFOL to be a syntactic first-order abstraction of ϕ in which modal subex-
pressions are coalesced—that is, replaced by fresh operators. If ϕ is (v = 0)⇒ ∇(v = 0), then
ϕFOL is (v = 0)⇒ ∇(v = 0) , where ∇(v = 0) is a new 0-ary operator symbol.
We want to ensure that subexpressions appearing more than once are abstracted by the
same operators, allowing for instances of first-order theorems to remain valid. This requires
some care for expressions that contain bound variables. For example, we expect to prove
(∃ x , z : ∇(v = x )) ≡ (∃ y : ∇(v = y)) (3)
We therefore define the fresh operator symbols ∇e as λ-abstractions over the bound variables
occurring in e, and these are identified modulo α-equivalence. Formally, we let eFOL = e
ε
FOL
where ε denotes the empty list and, for a list y of rigid variables, the first-order expression eyFOL
over the extended set of variables X ∪ V is defined inductively as follows.
• xyFOL =def x for x ∈ X a rigid variable,
• vyFOL =def v for v ∈ V a flexible variable,
• (op(e1, . . . , en))
y
FOL =def op((e1)
y
FOL, . . . , (en)
y
FOL) for op ∈ O,
• (e1 = e2)
y
FOL =def (e1)
y
FOL = (e2)
y
FOL,
• falseyFOL =def false
• (e1 ⇒ e2)
y
FOL =def (e1)
y
FOL ⇒ (e2)
y
FOL,
• (∀ x : e)yFOL =def ∀ x : e
x ,y
FOL,
• (∇e)yFOL =def λz : ∇e (z) where z is the subsequence of rigid variables in y that appear
free in e. (If z is the empty sequence, this is simply ∇e .)
With these definitions, the formula (3) is coalesced as
(∃ x , z : λx : ∇(v = x ) (x )) ≡ (∃ y : λy : ∇(v = y) (y)) (4)
which is an instance of the valid first-order equivalence
(∃ x , z : P(x )) ≡ (∃ y : P(y))
In particular, the two operator symbols occurring in (4) are identified because the two λ-
expressions are α-equivalent. Identification of coalesced formulas modulo α-equivalence ensures
that the translation is insensitive to the names of bound (rigid) variables. Section 8 discusses
techniques for abstracting from less superficial differences in first-order expressions, such as
between λx , y and λy, x and between a = b and b = a.
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4.2 Soundness of coalescing to FOL
For a set Γ of FOML formulas, we denote by ΓFOL the set of all formulas ψFOL, for ψ ∈ Γ. We
now show the soundness of the abstraction.
Theorem 1. For any set Γ of FOML formulas and any FOML formula ϕ, if ΓFOL |=FOL ϕFOL
then Γ |= ϕ.
Proof (sketch). Assume that Γ 6|= ϕ, so M = (I, ξ,W ,R, ζ,∇M) is a Kripke model such
that M,w ′ |= ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ and w ′ ∈ W , but that M,w 6|= ϕ for some w ∈ W .
For the extended set of variables X ∪ V , define the first-order structure S = (I ′, ξ′) where
I ′ agrees with I for all operator symbols that appear in Γ or ϕ, and where the valuation ξ′ is
defined by ξ′(x ) = ξ(x ) for x ∈ X and ξ′(v) = ζ(w , v) for v ∈ V . For the additional operator
symbols introduced in ΓFOL and ϕFOL, we define
I ′( λz : ∇e )(d1, . . . , dn) = [[∇e]]
M′
w
where M′ agrees with M except for the valuation ξ′ that assigns the ith variable of z to di .
This interpretation is well-defined: if ∇e1 and ∇e2 are two expressions in Γ or ϕ that give rise
to the same operator symbol, then (λz1 : ∇e1) and (λz2 : ∇e2) must be α-equivalent, and
therefore I ′( λz1 : ∇e1 )(d1, . . . , dn) = I
′( λz2 : ∇e2 )(d1, . . . , dn).
It is straightforward to prove that [[eFOL]]
S = [[e]]Mw holds for all expressions eFOL that appear
in ΓFOL or ϕFOL. In particular, it follows that S |=FOL ψFOL for all ψ ∈ Γ and S 6|=FOL ϕFOL.
This shows that ΓFOL 6|=FOL ϕFOL and concludes the proof. q.e.d.
5 Coalescing First-Order Expressions
We now define an abstraction ϕML of FOML formulas to formulas of propositional modal logic.
Again, we require for soundness that Γ |= ϕ whenever ΓML |=ML ϕML—that is, consequence
between abstracted formulas implies consequence between the original ones. In this way, we can
use theorem provers for propositional modal logic to carry out FOML proofs that are instances
of propositional modal reasoning. The abstraction ϕML replaces all first-order subexpressions
e of ϕ by new (propositional) flexible variables e , where variables ∀ x : e are once again
identified modulo α-equivalence. Formally, the translation is defined as follows.
• xML =def x for x ∈ X a rigid variable,
• vML =def v for v ∈ V a flexible variable,
• (op(t1, . . . , tn))ML =def op(t1, . . . , tn) for op ∈ O,
• (e1 = e2)ML =def e1 = e2 ,
• falseML =def false,
• (e1 ⇒ e2)ML =def (e1)ML ⇒ (e2)ML,
• (∀ x : e)ML =def ∀ x : e ,
• (∇e)ML =def ∇eML.
8
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As an example, coalescing the formula
(x = y) ∧ ∇∆true ⇒ ∇∆(x = y)
yields the ML-formula
x = y ∧ ∇∆true ⇒ ∇∆ x = y (5)
The implication (5) is not ML-valid. However, for rigid variables x and y, it follows from the
hypothesis x = y ⇒ ∇ x = y , which is justified by the FOML law (2).
For a set Γ of FOML formulas, we denote by ΓML the set of modal abstractions ψML, for
all ψ ∈ Γ. Moreover, we define the set H(Γ) to consist of all formulas of the form e ⇒ ∇ e ,
for all flexible variables e introduced in ΓML that correspond to rigid expressions e in Γ.
Theorem 2. Assume that Γ is a set of FOML formulas and that ϕ is a FOML formula. If
ΓML,H(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) |=ML ϕML then Γ |= ϕ.
Proof (sketch). As in Theorem 1, we prove the contra-positive. Assume that M =
(I, ξ,W ,R, ζ,∇M) is a Kripke model such that M,w
′ |= ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ and w ′ ∈ W , but
M,w 6|= ϕ for a certain w ∈ W .
Define the propositional Kripke model K = (W ,R, ζ′) where ζ′ assigns truth values in {tt, ff}
to all states w ′ ∈ W and flexible variables in ΓML or ϕML:
ζ′(w ′, v) = tt iff ζ(w ′, v) = tt for v ∈ V
ζ′(w ′, x ) = tt iff ξ(x ) = tt for x ∈ X
ζ′(w ′, op(t1, . . . , tn) ) = tt iff [[op(t1, . . . , tn)]]Mw ′ = tt
ζ′(w ′, e1 = e2 ) = tt iff [[e1]]Mw ′ = [[e2]]
M
w ′
ζ′(w ′, ∀ x : e ) = tt iff M,w ′ |= ∀ x : e
Again, ζ′ is well-defined. It is easy to prove, for all w ′ ∈ W and all e such that eML appears in
ΓML or ϕML, that K,w
′ |= eML iff [[e]]
M
w ′ = tt. In particular, it follows that K,w
′ |= ψML for all
ψ ∈ Γ and that K,w 6|=ML ϕML.
Furthermore, the definition of K ensures that K,w ′ |= ψ holds for all ψ ∈ H(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) and
all w ′ ∈ W because [[e]]Mw ′ = [[e]]
M
w ′′ holds for all rigid expressions e and all states w
′,w ′′ ∈ W .
It follows that ΓML,H(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) 6|=ML ϕML, which concludes the proof. q.e.d.
6 Coalescing in the presence of operator definitions
6.1 Operator definitions
We now extend our language to allow definitions of the form
d(x1, . . . , xn)
∆
= e
where d is a fresh symbol, x1, . . . , xn are pairwise distinct rigid variables, and e is an expression
whose free rigid variables are among x1, . . . , xn .
For an operator d defined as above and expressions e1, . . . , en , the application d(e1, . . . , en)
is a well-formed expression whose semantics is given by:
[[d(e1, . . . , en)]]
M
w = [[e[e1/x1, . . . , en/xn ]]]
M
w
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In other words, the defining expression is evaluated when the arguments have been substituted
for the variables. However, when reasoning about expressions containing defined operators, one
does not wish to systematically expand definitions. If the precise definition is unimportant, it
is better to leave the operator unexpanded in order to keep the formulas small. We now extend
the coalescing techniques introduced in the preceding sections to handle expressions that may
contain defined operators.
It is easy to see that the algorithm introduced in Section 5 for abstracting first-order subex-
pressions remains sound if we handle defined operators like operators in O. In particular, two
expressions d(e1) and d(e2) are abstracted by the same flexible variable only if they are syntacti-
cally equal up to α-equivalence. However, this simple approach does not work for the algorithm
of Section 4 that abstracts modal subexpressions. As an example, consider the definition
cst(x )
∆
= ∃ y : ∇(x = y) (6)
and the formula
(u = v) ⇒ (cst(u) ≡ cst(v)) (7)
where u and v are flexible variables. An expression e satisfies cst(e) at state w iff the value
of e is the same at all reachable states w ′. Hence, formula (7) is obviously not valid. If cst
were treated like an operator in O, the algorithm of Section 4 would leave (7) unchanged.
However, u and v would be considered ordinary (rigid) variables and cst would be considered
an uninterpreted operator symbol, so (7), seen as a FOL formula, would be provable. Thus, it
would be unsound to simply treat defined operators like operators in O in our algorithm for
coalescing modal subexpressions.
6.2 Rigid arguments and Leibniz positions
The example above shows that in the presence of definitions, FOML formulas without any
visible modal operators may violate the Leibniz principle that substituting equals for equals
should yield equal results. However, a first observation shows that the Leibniz principle still
holds for rigid arguments.
Lemma 3. For any defined n-ary operator d, expressions e1, . . . , en , any i ∈ 1 .. n with ei
rigid, Kripke model M, state w, and rigid variable x that does not occur free in any ej , we have
[[d(e1, . . . , en)]]
M
w = [[d(e1, . . . , ei−1, x , ei+1, . . . , en)]]
M′
w
whereM′ agrees withM except for the valuation ξ′ of rigid variables, which is like ξ but assigns
x to [[ei ]]
M
w .
Proof (sketch). Since ei is rigid, the value of [[ei ]]
M
w ′ , for any w
′ ∈W , is independent of the
state w ′. The assertion is then proved by induction on the defining expression for operator d .
q.e.d.
For a non-rigid argument of a defined operator, the Leibniz principle is preserved when the
argument does not appear in a modal context in the defining expression. We inductively define
which argument positions of an FOML operator or connective are Leibniz (satisfy the Leibniz
principle).
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Definition 4 (Leibniz argument positions).
• All argument positions of the operators in O and of all FOML connectives except ∇ are
Leibniz. The single argument position of ∇ is not Leibniz.
• For an operator defined by d(x1, . . . , xn)
∆
= e, the i th argument position of d is Leibniz iff
xi does not occur within a non-Leibniz argument position in e.
In other words, the ith argument position of a defined operator is Leibniz iff the ith parameter
does not appear in the scope of any occurrence of ∇ in the full expansion of the defining
expression.
Lemma 5. Assume that d is a defined n-ary operator whose i th argument position is Leibniz
(for i ∈ 1 .. n). For any expressions e1, . . . , en , Kripke model M, state w and rigid variable x
that does not occur free in any ej , we have
[[d(e1, . . . , en)]]
M
w = [[d(e1, . . . , ei−1, x , ei+1, . . . , en)]]
M′
w
whereM′ agrees withM except for the valuation ξ′ of rigid variables, which is like ξ but assigns
x to [[ei ]]
M
w .
Proof (sketch). Induction on the syntax of the defining expression for d . q.e.d.
It follows from Lemmas 3 and 5 that the implication
(ei = f ) ⇒ (d(e1, . . . , en) = d(e1, . . . , ei−1, f , ei+1, . . . , en))
is valid when ei and f are rigid expressions or when the i
th argument position of d is Leibniz.
6.3 Coalescing for defined operators
The definition of the syntactic abstraction eFOL for the extended language is now completed
by defining
• (d(e1, . . . , en))
y
FOL =def d , ǫ1, . . . , ǫn ((e1)
y
FOL, . . . , (en)
y
FOL) for a defined n-ary operator
d where
ǫi = ∗ if the i
th position of d is Leibniz or ei is a rigid expression,
ǫi = ei otherwise.
With these definitions, the single argument position of operator cst introduced by (6) is not
Leibniz, and coalescing formula (7) yields
(v = w) ⇒ ( cst , v (v) ≡ cst ,w (w))
for two distinct fresh operators cst , v and cst ,w . As expected, this formula cannot be proved.
However, the formula ∀ x , y : (x = y) ⇒ (cst(x ) ≡ cst(y)) is coalesced as ∀ x , y : (x = y) ⇒
( cst , ∗ (x ) ≡ cst , ∗ (y)) and is valid.
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Theorem 6. Theorem 1 remains valid for FOML formulas in the presence of defined operator
symbols.
Proof (sketch). Extending the proof of Theorem 1, we define the interpretation of the fresh
operator symbols as follows:
I ′( d , ǫ1, . . . , ǫn )(d1, . . . , dn) = [[d(α1, . . . , αn)]]
M′
w
where αi =
{
ei if ǫi = ei
xi if ǫi = ∗
In this definition, w is the state fixed in the proof and M′ agrees with M except for the
valuation ξ′ that assigns the variables xi to di .
Again, one proves that [[eFOL]]
S = [[e]]Mw for all expressions eFOL that appear in ΓFOL
or ϕFOL. For the expressions corresponding to applications of defined operators, the proof
is obvious for those arguments where ǫi = ei , and it makes use of Lemmas 3 and 5 when
ǫi = ∗. q.e.d.
7 Proving Safety Properties by Coalescing in TLA
We now give evidence for the usefulness of coalescing by showing that it can be the basis for a
complete proof system for establishing safety properties in TLA+, assuming the ability to prove
any valid first-order formula in the set-theoretic language underlying TLA+. In fact, we argue
that proofs of arbitrary safety properties can be transformed into the form used in Section 2.
In TLA+, properties of systems are expressed as temporal logic formulas, which are evaluated
over infinite sequences of states. We say that a formula is true of a finite sequence of states if it
is true for some infinite extension of that finite sequence. A formula expresses a safety property
if it holds for an infinite sequence of states if and only if it holds for every finite prefix of that
sequence.
The standard form of a TLA+ specification is Init∧✷[Next ]v∧L where Init is a state predicate
(a first-order formula that contains only unprimed state variables), v is a tuple containing all
state variables, Next is an action formula (a formula of first-order logic extended by the prime
operator), and L is a conjunction of fairness conditions that are irrelevant for proving safety
properties. In order to prove that the specification establishes a safety property P , we need to
establish the theorem
Init ∧✷[Next ]v ⇒ P .
The first step is to reformulate the problem as an invariant assertion of the form
HInit ∧ ✷[HNext ]hv ⇒ ✷Inv (8)
where Inv is a state predicate. A general way to do this is to add a history variable [1] to the
original specification. The history variable records the sequence of states seen so far, and Inv
is true for a given value of the history variable if and only if the safety property P is true for
the corresponding sequence of states.
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The second step is to prove the invariance of Inv by using an inductive invariant—a state
predicate IInv such that all of the following formulas are valid:
1. HInit ⇒ IInv
2. IInv ∧ [HNext ]hv ⇒ IInv
′
3. IInv ⇒ Inv
Assuming that formula (8) is valid, a suitable inductive invariant IInv exists under standard
assumptions on the expressiveness of the language of state predicates (see, e.g., [2]), and these
assumptions are satisfied by the set-theoretic language underlying TLA+.
By coalescing to propositional temporal logic using the techniques described in Section 5,
a PTL decision procedure easily checks that (8) follows from facts (1)–(3) above. In practice,
we find it preferable to verify inferences in temporal logic by appealing to a decision procedure
rather than by applying a fixed set of rules because the user is then free to structure the proof
in the most convenient way. For example, the inductive invariant could be split into several
mutually inductive formulas, for which the corresponding facts may be easier to check than
(1)–(3) in the standard invariance proof above. On the other hand, the inductive nature of
the typical temporal logic proofs such as the one above makes it unrealistic to expect that an
ordinary FOL prover would be able to establish the FOL translation of (8) from (1)–(3).
Completing the proof of (8) requires proving formulas (1)–(3). Observe that (1) and (3) are
state predicates and thus ordinary first-order formulas in TLA+’s set theory. By assumption,
their proofs can be discharged by the underlying FOL prover.
Formula (2) is an action formula and therefore contains TLA+’s prime operator in addition
to first-order logic, but no other operator of temporal logic. We now show how we reduce the
proof of an action formula A to FOL proofs with the help of coalescing.
We begin by eliminating all defined operators that occur in A, expanding their definitions.
This results in an action formula B that is equivalent to A, but that only contains built-in
TLA+ operators. Second, we use the fact that prime distributes over all non-modal built-in
TLA+ operators and rewrite formula B to an equivalent action formula C in which prime is only
applied to flexible variables.1 Finally, we apply the coalescing technique described in Section 4
for abstracting the prime modality, and obtain a formula CFOL. It can be shown that for the
restricted fragment where all modal expressions are of the form v ′ for flexible variables v , the
formula C is FOML-valid if and only if CFOL is FOL-valid, and therefore the underlying FOL
prover will be able to prove formula (2) above.
The procedure above shows how in theory the two forms of coalescing that we have proposed
in this paper can be complete for proving safety properties in TLA+, assuming that we have a
complete proof procedure for the set theory underlying TLA+. In practice, no such procedure
can exist and it is preferable to keep formulas small, so it is important not to expand all
definitions. These practical considerations underlie the handling of defined operators described
in Section 6. Although we have focused on safety properties, for which we can obtain a
completeness result, the same overall technique can also be applied to the proof of liveness
properties. In TLA, liveness properties are also proved by combining action-level reasoning and
temporal logic proof rules. Most of the steps in such a proof can be reduced by coalescing to
FOL or propositional ML reasoning. However, there will often be a few steps that require non-
propositional temporal logic reasoning—for example, because they are based on well-founded
orderings. Because there are not many such steps, a backend prover for them with a low degree
of automation should be acceptable.
1The syntax of TLA+ ensures that prime cannot be nested.
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8 Conclusion
We presented a technique of coalescing that allows a user to decompose the proof of FOML
formulas into purely first-order and purely propositional modal reasoning. This technique is
inspired by reasoning about TLA+ specifications and has been implemented in the TLA+ Proof
System, where we have found it useful for verifying temporal logic properties. In particular,
the overwhelming majority of proof obligations that arise during TLA+ proofs contain only
the prime modal operator. For this fragment, rewriting by the valid equality op(e1, . . . , en)
′ =
op(e ′1, . . . , e
′
n), for operators op ∈ O, followed by coalescing to FOL is complete. Many of the
proof obligations that involve the ✷ modality of TLA+ are instances of propositional temporal
reasoning, and these can be handled by coalescing to ML and invoking a decision procedure for
propositional temporal logic.
Coalescing to FOL eschews semantic translation of FOML formulas [12] in favor of replac-
ing a subformula whose principal operator is modal by a fresh operator symbol. The resulting
formulas are simpler than those obtained by semantic translation, and they can readily be
understood in terms of the original FOML formulation of the problem. Coalescing is not a
complete proof procedure in itself. For example, the valid Barcan formula (1) cannot be proved
using only our two translations. TLA proofs contain only a small number of such proof obliga-
tions, and we expect TLAPS to be able to handle them with a semantic translation to FOL. In
our context, the validity problem of first-order temporal logic is Π11-complete, so incompleteness
should not be considered an argument against the use of coalescing. Semantic translation of
temporal logic would require inductive reasoning over natural numbers, and we could not even
expect simple proofs such as the one shown in Section 2 to be discharged automatically, whereas
proof by coalescing benefits from efficient decision procedures for propositional temporal logic.
For applications other than TLA+ theorem proving that require first-order modal reasoning,
the trade-off in choosing between semantic translation and coalescing will depend upon how
effective one expects semantic translation and standard first-order theorem proving to work in
practice. One recent experiment [3] found this technique entirely satisfactory, but it used a
modal logic too weak to handle the applications that concern us.
The definition of coalescing to FOL presented in Section 4 identifies modal subformulas
such as (3) that are identical up to the names of bound rigid variables that they contain. This
definition can be refined to identify formulas that differ in less superficial ways. For example,
it may be desirable to reorder bound variables according to their appearance in coalesced
subformulas. This would allow us to coalesce the formula
(∃ y ∀ x : ✷P(x , y))⇒ (∀ x ∃ y : ✷P(x , y))
to the valid FOL formula
(∃ y ∀ x : λx , y : ✷P(x , y) (x , y))⇒ (∀ x ∃ y : λx , y : ✷P(x , y) (x , y))
rather than the formula
(∃ y ∀ x : λy, x : ✷P(x , y) (y, x ))⇒ (∀ x ∃ y : λx , y : ✷P(x , y) (x , y))
obtained according to the definition given in Section 4, which results in the two fresh operators
being distinct. In general, we would like coalesced versions of different expressions to use the
same atomic symbol wherever that would be valid. For example, e1 = e2 and e2 = e1 could
be the same symbol.
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Rewriting a formula before coalescing can also make the translated obligation easier to
prove. For example, the formula ✷e for a rigid expression e can be replaced by ✷false ∨ e.
In a modal logic whose ✷ modality is reflexive, the disjunct ✷false is not necessary. In this
way, the formula
∀ x , y : ✷(x = y)⇒ ✷(f (x ) = f (y))
for f ∈ O could be proved directly by translating with coalescing to FOL instead of requiring
two steps, the first proving (x = y)⇒ (f (x ) = f (y)) with FOL and the second being translated
to ML. Another such rewriting is distributing TLA’s modal prime operator over rigid operators
used by TLAPS when translating to FOL.
We don’t know yet if optimizations of the translations beyond those we have already imple-
mented in TLAPS will be useful in practice. So far, we have proved only safety properties for
realistic algorithms, which in TLA requires little temporal reasoning. We have begun writing
formal liveness proofs, but TLAPS will not completely check them until we have a transla-
tion that can handle formulas which, like the Barcan formula, inextricably mix quantifiers and
modal operators.
References
[1] Mart´ın Abadi and Leslie Lamport. The existence of refinement mappings. Theoretical Computer
Science, 81(2):253–284, May 1991.
[2] Krzysztof R. Apt. Ten years of Hoare’s logic: A survey—part I. ACM Trans. Program. Lang.
Syst., 3(4):431–483, October 1981.
[3] Christoph Benzmu¨ller and Bruno Woltzenlogel Paleo. Go¨del’s God on the computer. In Stephan
Schulz, Geoff Sutcliffe, and Boris Konev, editors, 10th Intl. Workshop Implementation of Logics,
EPiC Series. EasyChair, 2013.
[4] Torben Brau¨ner and Silvio Ghilardi. First order modal logic. In Patrick Blackburn, Johan van
Benthem, and Frank Wolter, editors, Handbook of Modal Logic, pages 549–620. Elsevier, 2007.
[5] Denis Cousineau, Damien Doligez, Leslie Lamport, Stephan Merz, Daniel Ricketts, and Herna´n
Vanzetto. TLA+ proofs. In Dimitra Giannakopoulou and Dominique Me´ry, editors, 18th Intl.
Symp. Formal Methods (FM 2012), volume 7436 of LNCS, pages 147–154, Paris, France, 2012.
Springer.
[6] Melvin Fitting and Richard L. Mendelsohn. First-Order Modal Logic. Synthese Library. Springer,
1998.
[7] Harald Ganzinger, Robert Nieuwenhuis, and Pilar Nivela. The Saturate system, 1998. http:
//www.mpi-inf.mpg.de/SATURATE/doc/Saturate/Saturate.html.
[8] Fausto Giunchiglia and Roberto Sebastiani. Building decision procedures for modal logics from
propositional decision procedures: The case study of modal k(m). Information and Computation,
162(1-2):158–178, 2000.
[9] Ullrich Hustadt and Renate A. Schmidt. MSPASS: Modal reasoning by translation and first-order
resolution. In Roy Dyckhoff, editor, TABLEAUX, volume 1847 of LNCS, pages 67–71. Springer,
2000.
[10] Leslie Lamport. Specifying Systems, The TLA+ Language and Tools for Hardware and Software
Engineers. Addison-Wesley, 2002.
[11] Leslie Lamport. Byzantizing Paxos by refinement. In David Peleg, editor, Distributed Computing:
25th Intl. Symp. (DISC 2011), pages 211–224. Springer-Verlag, 2011.
[12] Hans Ju¨rgen Ohlbach. Semantics-based translation methods for modal logics. J. Log. Comput.,
1(5):691–746, 1991.
15
